What is strikingly absent from virtually all left analysis is any discussion of class and political economy in both Israel and the Occupied Territories. While this may seem a strange accusation to make of left-wing writing, I believe the absence of class-based analysis is in itself indicative of the confusion with which much of the left views the Israeli state. For much of the left, Israeli politics is simply understood as the binary opposites of the right-wing Likud and the more peace-inclined Labor Party. I aim to show below that such a view stems from a mistaken approach to understanding class formation in Israel.
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Untitled Document
Class, Economy, and the Second Intifada
by Adam Hanieh
The current Palestinian Intifada and Israel's brutal response has been
the subject of countless articles over the last two years. There is however
a disappointing vacuum within left analysis, with much of this writing attempting
to explain the character of Israeli policy through the right-wing views of Ariel
Sharon. Within this framework, Israeli strategy is presented as a racist extension
of colonialist designs on the Occupied Territories sometimes including the expulsion
of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip (hereafter referred to as
WB/GS).
What is strikingly absent from virtually all left analysis is any discussion
of class and political economy in both Israel and the Occupied Territories.
While this may seem a strange accusation to make of left-wing writing, I believe
the absence of class-based analysis is in itself indicative of the confusion
with which much of the left views the Israeli state. For much of the left, Israeli
politics is simply understood as the binary opposites of the right-wing Likud
and the more peace-inclined Labor Party. I aim to show below that such a view
stems from a mistaken approach to understanding class formation in Israel and
that without placing class at the center of our analysis, it is difficult to
develop an adequate understanding of what is actually occurring on the ground.
In essence, I argue that Israeli capitalism was brought into being by the Labor
Zionist movement (today represented by the Labor Party) and that the Oslo process
was a key step in its formation.1 Israel's war against the Palestinian people
today is the logical extension of this process, aimed at creating a Palestinian
canton-state. Because of the central role of the Labor Zionist movement in building
Israeli capitalism, the terms 'left' and 'right' are
often confused in the Israeli case.
Moreover, over the last ten years, Israel has progressively delinked itself
from reliance on cheap Palestinian labor while strengthening the dependence
of the Occupied Territories on the Israeli economy. The result is a Palestinian
society with a highly distorted class structure'a capitalist class dependent
on its privileged relationship with Israeli capital and a working class that
has little strategic weight in the national struggle.
Class and State in Israeli Society
Much academic and popular commentary on Israel sees the predominant weight
of Israel's state in the first four decades since the country's
establishment in 1948 as evidence that Israel was a socialist economy. This
belief found sustenance in the political writings of the Labor Zionist movement
itself, through the role of collective settlement'particularly the kibbutz
movement'and the strength of the trade union movement, the Histadrut,
as the largest single employer throughout most of Israel's history.2
Since the mid-1980s, and accelerating during the 1990s, Israel's political
economy has undergone a dramatic transformation. Over the last fifteen years,
the country's economic structure has changed significantly and Israel
has embraced an outwardly expanding vision of global capitalism. Based largely
on International Monetary Fund and World Bank prescriptions, the Israeli government
has privatized state-owned enterprises, relaxed government control of the capital
markets, and reduced real wages.
Traditional approaches to Israel's political economy attempted to explain
these changes as resulting from an ideological shift in Israel's elite.
According to this approach, Israel's leaders used to ascribe to a version
of socialist ideology and then in the mid-1980s they rapidly embraced a neoliberal
capitalist prescription for their economic woes.
In contrast, a new generation of Israeli scholars writing over the last decade
have argued that a new approach is required towards understanding Israel's
establishment.3 They have argued that the development
of the Zionist movement is best understood in the context of a settler movement
attempting to win control over the land and labor markets. The private capitalist
class of the original settler movement was weak and divided, and a collectivist
approach to settlement led by the Labor Zionist movement was the most effective
way of settling the land and evicting the indigenous population. The strength
of the Histadrut and the leading role of the Labor Zionist movement were best
explained through the weakness of the Jewish capitalist class that existed pre-1948
and the need to provide work for Jewish immigrants as well as exclude the indigenous
Palestinian working class from the labor market as a prelude to expulsion.
Because of the embryonic nature of both the capitalist and working class during
the settlement period, the Israeli state that developed after 1948 was concerned
not only with settling the land, but also in building classes themselves. This
class formation passed through two key phases in the period between 1948 and
1985:
1. 1948-1973: This period was characterized by high levels of growth
financed by unilateral capital transfers from German reparations and foreign
Jewry. It was an initial period of state and class formation, thus the state
directed virtually all capital transfers to favored business groups considered
allies in the 'national project.' These groups eventually developed into the
key conglomerates that dominated the Israeli economy in the following years.
The Israeli working class was formed through the high levels of immigration
of Arab, African, and Asian Jews'who were to become ethnically defined as 'Mizrahim.'
Following the 1967 Israeli occupation of the WB/GS, the Israeli economy underwent
the so-called Palestinian boom. The occupation significantly increased the size
of Israel's domestic market and provided another source of cheap labor.
This labor force was cheap and highly exploitable, and by the mid-1980s, Palestinians
from the WB/GS made up around 7 percent of the Israeli labor force.4
Around one-third of the WB/GS labor force worked in Israel in 1985, with 47
percent of this number working in the construction industry. This cheap labor
force provided a large boost to the Israeli economy by filling the lowest rungs
of the labor market and covering some of the shortfall caused by prolonged Israeli
military service. It also enabled some Mizrahim workers to move up to positions
of foreman and supervisors, thereby reducing some of the ethnic tensions that
had arisen during the 1970s between Mizrahi and European Jews.
2. 1974-1985: In the late 1960s the large core conglomerates had coalesced
into five key business groups'Koor, Hapoalim, Leumi, Clal, and Israel Discount
Bank Holdings (IDB). The first four conglomerates were controlled by the state,
Histadrut, and the Labor Zionist movement, while IDB was privately owned. Beginning
with the Israeli occupation of the WB/GS in 1967 and accelerating following
the 1973 war, military production moved to the center stage of the Israeli political
economy. This military spending was directed by the state to the key conglomerates
and led to massive rates of accumulation for the core business groups while
the economy as a whole suffered from stagflation.5
In the mid-1980s, this system began to break down due to a number of different
factors. On a global level, a worldwide recession and a drop in demand for military
hardware in the international market due to global political realignment began
to limit conglomerate profits. Locally, the onset of hyperinflation began to
strangle the economy as a whole and made financial planning difficult.
In response to these changes, the state'under the tutelage of the Labor
wing of the Zionist movement'undertook a significant change of direction
that began with the Economic Stabilization Plan of 1985 (ESP). This change consisted
of four interrelated processes:
1. A change in the relationship between the state and the key conglomerates.
The ESP inaugurated a new phase in the relationship between the state and the
capitalist class. The key conglomerates were separated from the state apparatus
and passed into the hands of the new capitalist class. The state would no longer
shelter these conglomerates but rather, the conglomerates became the key sites
of capital accumulation for a truly private capitalist class. This was achieved
through breaking up the Histadrut empire, passing its remnants into private
hands and the privatization of government and quasi-state bodies.
2. The coalescence of a new capitalist class. This capitalist class
came from a fusion of three different sources: global capital'often with
links to the Zionist movement'such as U.S. businessman Ted Arison and
Canadian billionaire Charles Bronfman; local private capital that had previously
been supported by the state, such as the Recanati and Ofer families; and thirdly,
elements of the state bureaucracy that had led the ESP and privatization process.
3. The insertion of Israel into the globalized economy. Beginning in
the mid-1980s, the Israeli economy was opened up to the world economy through
relaxation of foreign ownership and investment laws and the joint listing of
local companies on stock exchanges around the world. The capitalist class detailed
in (2) was not homogenous. The third sector of the capitalist class identified
above, previous state bureaucrats, tended to become managers of the new private
companies. Following the onset of negotiations with the Palestinians in the
early 1990s, large indigenous Israeli private capitalists were integrated into
a new globalized world order through significant investments and ownership ties
with foreign capital, in particular in the United States and Asia. Thirdly,
international capital'particularly U.S. capital'began to invest
heavily in Israel as the Israeli economy was integrated into the global capitalist
order.
4. Restructuring the worker-capitalist relationship. Breaking up the
conglomerates and the Histadrut empire had a significant impact on the relationship
between the worker and the capitalist owner. The old system that had seen a
privileged layer of workers exist alongside a highly exploited sector was broken
down through severing the link between the Histadrut and the economy. There
was a large increase in the rate of exploitation experienced by the working
class reflected in productivity rate increases that exceed real wage growth.
Several state policies were responsible for this, in particular, the devaluation
of the shekel and the weakening of cost-of-living allowance that had been paid
to compensate for inflation. In addition, government fiscal policies such as
ending or lowering subsidization for certain goods contributed to a transfer
of wealth from the poor to the new capitalist class.
These changes characterize the 'new' Israeli political economy,
and have been reflected on the political and cultural levels. Some indication
of these changes include: (1) the growth in civic organizations and extraparliamentary
movements as the state has withdrawn from the public sphere, (2) an increasing
'McDonaldization' of Israeli culture as U.S. capital has increased
investment in the country, and (3) political developments such as the Oslo process
which was a key step in allowing Israeli capital to move onto the global and
regional stage.
It must be stressed that the Labor Party was the guiding force in this transition
to neoliberal capitalism. Its social base has traditionally been wealthier Jews
from Europe and America, whereas the rival Likud began to win allegiance from
the poorer layers of Jews from Africa and the Middle East (Mizrahim) in the
1970s. The Likud Party won their first elections in 1977, largely due to support
from the poor and disadvantaged Mizrahim and the view that Labor represented
the European Jewish elite. Today, there is very little difference between the
economic policies of Labor and Likud'both have wholeheartedly embraced
U.S.-style neoliberalism. On the political level, there is also remarkable congruence
between mainstream Labor and Likud on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Today
the head of the Labor Party, Benyamin Ben Eliezer, is overseeing the brutal
repression of the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories in his
position as Defense Minister. It is this convergence of the Labor and Likud
that explains the collapse of Labor as a political force in Israel.6
Oslo and Israeli Capitalism
At the beginning of the Oslo process, the emerging capitalist class was a vocal
supporter of the negotiations. A typical example of this support was Benny Gaon.
Gaon became CEO of the Histradut's flagship company, Koor, in 1987, and
led the transformation of Koor into a private company. For Gaon and the new
Israeli capitalist class, Oslo was a critical step in the opening up of Israel
to the global marketplace. According to this view, it would be impossible to
attract significant foreign investment to Israel while conflict persisted. It
would also be very difficult for Israeli companies to invest in the United States,
Europe, and the so-called emerging markets without a political resolution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Koor launched its Peace Project shortly after
the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 which united Israeli, Palestinian,
Arab, and European business in joint investment projects in the region. It also
was a chief partner with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in infrastructure projects
and exporting goods to the WB/GS.
The reasons for this support largely stemmed from the need to end the Arab
boycott of the Israeli economy and ensure the stability of the business environment
in Israel. Israel aimed to subcontract low-technology industry such as textiles
to factories in Egypt and Jordan at a much cheaper labor cost than inside Israel.
To a large extent this has been successful, with Israeli companies now producing
their goods in industrial zones in Jordan, Egypt, and the Occupied Territories.
Beginning in 1993, Israel consciously moved to substitute foreign workers from
Asia and Eastern Europe for the daily Palestinian labor force that had worked
in Israel since 1967. While foreign workers were slightly more costly as they
had to be housed and brought to the country, they were highly exploitable and
were often brought 'illegally' (although with full knowledge of
the Israeli government). They were brought by labor-hire firms set up in Thailand,
the Philippines, and Romania, with employers taking their passports on arrival,
employing them in very poor conditions and often withholding pay. They formed
an ideal reserve army of labor, as they could easily be deported to their home
countries on charges of being in Israel illegally.
Importantly, the foreign workers that arrived in the hundred thousands following
Oslo meant that the Israeli economy was no longer dependent upon Palestinian
workers. Instead, Palestinian labor became a 'tap' that could be
turned on and off depending on the economic and political situation. Between
1992'1996, Palestinian employment in Israel declined from 116,000 workers
(33 percent of the Palestinian labor force) to 28,100 (6 percent of the Palestinian
labor force). Earnings from work in Israel collapsed from 25 percent of Palestinian
GNP in 1992 to 6 percent in 1996.7 Between 1997 and 1999, an upturn in the Israeli economy
saw the numbers of Palestinian workers increase to approximately pre-1993 levels.
However, following the beginning of the current Intifada, the number of workers
dropped drastically due to border closures and refusal to issue permits. Since
September 2000, around 75'80,000 Palestinians have lost their jobs inside
Israel or the settlements. These figures indicate that the Palestinian labor
force in Israel has become a second reserve army of labor alongside foreign
workers.
Relationship between the Palestinian Authority and Israel
The crux of Israeli strategy for the WB/GS is control over the Palestinian
population without direct military rule over Palestinian towns and villages.
Oslo aimed to keep Palestinian movement, goods, the economy and borders under
Israeli control, while the Palestinian population was to be ruled by a Palestinian
Authority (PA) whose power rested upon the blessing of the Israeli and U.S.
governments. The primary responsibility of the PA was to ensure the 'security'
of Israel'i.e., to act as a police force for the occupying force. In the
classic colonialist sense, the natives were to be given 'self-rule,'
carefully circumscribed within the context of Israel's continuing control
and domination.
The Palestinian economy is completely integrated into and dependent upon the
Israeli economy. Approximately 75 percent of all imports to the WB/GS originate
in Israel while 95 percent of all WB/GS exports are destined for Israel. Israel's
complete control over all external borders mean that it is impossible for the
Palestinian economy to develop meaningful trade relations with a third country.
The WB/GS are highly dependent on imported goods, with total imports amounting
to approximately 80 percent of GDP. In such a situation of very weak local production
and high dependence on imports, the economic power of the Palestinian capitalist
class does not stem from local industry or production, but is comprador in nature.
Its profits are drawn from the exclusive import rights on Israeli goods, and
control over large monopolies that were granted to those loyal to Arafat. The
privileged relationship with Israeli capital is the defining feature of the
Palestinian bourgeoisie. Since 1993, this bourgeoisie has fused with sections
of the PA bureaucracy and forms a major pillar of Arafat's rule.
From the very beginning of the Oslo process, the PA has been completely dependent
upon Israel, the United States, and Europe for its continued existence. Between
1995 and 2000, 60 percent of the total PA revenue came from indirect taxes collected
by the Israeli government on goods imported from abroad and destined for the
Occupied Territories. This money is collected by the Israeli government and
then transferred to the PA each month according to a process outlined in the
1995 Paris Protocol economic agreement between the PA and Israel.8
This means that if the Israeli government chooses to withhold payment of this
money'as it has since December 2000'then the PA faces a major fiscal
crisis.
The other major source of PA income is foreign disbursements from the United
States, Europe, and Arab governments. In 2001, these funds covered about 75
percent of the PA's salary budget. Without this money, 122,000 PA public
sector employees would not have been paid. In addition, foreign donors supported
emergency programs such as food relief, employment creation schemes and reconstruction
of destroyed infrastructure. The total WB/GS trade deficit is 45'50 percent
of GDP and this is principally financed by foreign aid.
This relationship between the Palestinian areas and the Israeli economy, and
the comprador nature of the Palestinian capitalist class, has produced a distinctive
character to the Palestinian working class. The labor force is divided into
three broad areas of employment'workers in Israel and the settlements
who are severely affected by the current political situation, a large number
of employees in the PA public sector, and a private sector dominated by small
business. There is virtually no industrial working class to speak of in the
WB/GS.
While Palestinian labor employed in Israel has declined in importance for the
Israeli economy, it still makes up a very significant proportion of the Palestinian
labor force. In the months prior to the beginning of the Intifada in 2000, just
over 20 percent of the Palestinian labor force in the WB/GS (excluding Jerusalem)
worked in Israel or the settlements.
In 1988, during the first uprising in the Occupied Territories, the proportion
of the Palestinian labor force working inside Israel exceeded 50 percent. Thus
over twelve years, there has been a 60 percent drop in the proportion of the
Palestinian labor force working for Israeli employees. Where have these workers
gone?
The large growth area in employment since the Oslo process has been public
sector employment within the PA, which accounts for nearly 25 percent of employment
in the local economy. The proportion of the labor force employed in the public
sector has almost doubled since mid-1996. More than half of the PA's expenditure
is on wages for the public sector.
The third major sector of employment is the private sector, particularly in
the area of services. What distinguishes this sector is that it is overwhelmingly
dominated by small family-owned businesses. The Palestinian territories lack
any significant large industry due to thirty years of Israeli de-development
policies. Over 90 percent of Palestinian private sector businesses employ less
than ten people.
Political Implications
On the economic level, Oslo pushed the development of a parasitic Palestinian
capitalist class that was reliant upon its relationship with Israeli capital
for its profits. Meanwhile, Israel ended its dependence on cheap Palestinian
labor through a massive influx of highly-exploited foreign workers. Instead,
Palestinian workers became a reserve army of labor that could be turned on and
off at whim. Decades of de-development and Israel's complete control over
its Palestinian hinterland means that domestic Palestinian labor is either dependent
on a public sector paid for by foreign aid or concentrated in small, privately-owned
family businesses.
This structure of the Palestinian working class is highly significant in terms
of political strategy. Although the Palestinian working class is large, there
is no organized sector with the economic weight to place a class-based strategy
at the center of the Palestinian national liberation movement. This differs,
perhaps, from the example of the antiapartheid movement in South Africa, in
which the organized working class'particularly mine workers'were
able to play a central role in the movement.
The reality of this class structure is clearly apparent on the ground today.
Since April of this year, around 700,000 people in the West Bank have been living
under curfew for most of the time. Curfew'essentially house arrest'means
that no one living in a major Palestinian town can leave their house without
threat of being shot dead by the Israeli army. The days on which curfew is lifted
for a few hours gives residents of these towns enough time to buy food and see
friends, not sustain any meaningful productive activity. In such a context,
basic life planning becomes an impossibility. From one day to the next it is
impossible to know if you will be able to go to work, school, or university
or whether you will be confined to your home. The result is a population whose
life has been put on hold.
The reality of curfew illustrates perfectly the changes in both Palestinian
and Israeli class structures since Oslo. In a regularly functioning capitalist
society, this kind of curfew would be impossible because it brings work and
industry to a complete halt for months on end. During the first Intifada, that
began in 1988, Israel imposed regular curfews on some villages but never for
the length and scale as the current period. These measures, as well as absenteeism
during the first Intifada caused by general strikes, led the head of the Israeli
Employment Service to call the situation 'traumatic' for the Israeli
economy. Today, all Israeli political leaders support the permanent curfews
and closures and champion economic separation.
The structure of the Palestinian working class deeply effects political strategy
in the current Intifada. The concept of strikes or other labor actions are nonexistent,
as they have virtually no effect on the Israeli economy and only hurt Palestinian
workers and their families. Another suggestion for political action that has
regularly been raised throughout the Intifada is a boycott of Israeli goods.
Despite some symbolic attempts, the economic relationship between Israel and
the Palestinian economies makes this virtually impossible as most goods are
imported from Israel. There are no local sources of dairy products, meat, cement,
many fruits and vegetables, or electrical products. Electricity, phone lines,
water and even the Palestinian internet is ultimately controlled by the Israeli
government.
Is Oslo Dead?
A common refrain heard in the mainstream media as well as from sections of
the PA and Israeli government is that the current Intifada means the end of
the Oslo process. Some Palestinian commentators accuse Israel of wanting to
destroy the PA and return the so-called Israeli Civil Administration that ruled
the WB/GS until 1993.
The problem with these statements is that on close examination they bear little
resemblance to what is actually happening on the ground. It is important here
to distinguish between what Oslo was claimed to represent and what it was intended
to achieve.
If the Oslo process is understood as a strategy to create a canton state'regardless
of handshakes on the White House lawns'then it is clear that Oslo is far
from dead. Over the last month, the Israeli government has been carrying out
a plan aimed at expropriating land in the West Bank and forcing Palestinians
into these cantons. This plan resembles the reservations set up by the South
African government for the black population of that country during the years
of apartheid. A nine-meter-high wall stretching for hundreds of kilometers is
being finished around the northern West Bank towns of Nablus, Jenin, Qalqilya,
and Tulkarem. A similar wall is being built around Jerusalem. In conjunction
with this construction, a new pass-card system has been put in place that requires
any Palestinian wishing to move between Palestinian towns to obtain a special
weekly permit issued by the Israeli military commander of the West Bank. All
goods moving into Palestinian areas must pass through one of three transit points
under the control of the Israeli military. In essence, the West Bank has been
divided into three cantons'in the north, center, and south of the West
Bank'with all movement of goods and people between these areas under the
control of the Israeli military.
These three cantons in the West Bank are separated by large Israeli settlement
blocs and sprawling highways that are off limits to Palestinians. Special license
plates distinguish between Palestinian and Israeli drivers and constitute another
pillar of the emerging apartheid system in the West Bank.
The Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip has been effectively cut off from
any connection with the West Bank for over a decade and constitutes the fourth
canton under the Israeli plan. The Gaza Strip has been surrounded by a fence
for many years and is now one of the most densely populated areas on the planet'with
one million people literally locked into a few square kilometers. Permits are
even required from the Israeli military for Palestinian fishermen to venture
out into the sea to earn their livelihood.
Behind this process lies the economic changes outlined above: an attempt by
Israeli capitalism to impose a political solution to the conflict that would
assist Israel's participation in the global marketplace; permit the Israeli
economy to liberalize and reduce military expenditure; and open up both labor
and consumer markets in the Middle East.
The major impediment to this process are the Palestinian masses, not the PA.
The aim of current Israeli strategy is not the destruction of the PA but exactly
the opposite, strengthening it in order to better repress the population. Some
members of the PA will go in this process, but it is not individuals that are
important but rather the structure as a whole and its role.
It is difficult to talk today of an 'Intifada' in the sense of
a mass, popular movement. For the reasons outlined above, there is little mass
participation in the actual uprising. There is however a strong spirit of resistance
summed up in the Arabic expression 'samideen''or the steadfast.
This is why the form of repression adopted by the Israeli government is characterized
by mass collective punishment of the population'tactics aimed at demoralizing
and starving a population to submission.
Notes
- The Declaration of Principles (DOP), commonly called the Oslo Agreement,
was signed between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization
on September 13, 1993. It was the product of secret negotiations between the
Israeli government and Palestinian negotiators. Despite the widespread illusion
that Oslo was an agreement intended to achieve peace and establish a Palestinian
state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it was a highly flawed agreement that
gave the illusion of Palestinian sovereignty but perpetuated Israeli dominance
in all areas as I shall demonstrate later in the article.
- The Histadrut (General Federation of Workers in Eretz Israel) was the administrative
backbone of the pre-state settlement, controlling the colonization effort,
economic production and marketing, labor employment, and defense. The Histadrut
was not a trade union in the classical sense, instead, its priorities were
defined by 'national' objectives not the interests of workers.
Indeed, in 1960, the General Secretary of the Histadrut Pinhas Lavon characterized
the organization,
The General Federation of Workers was founded forty years ago by several thousand
young people wanting to work in an under-developed country where labor was
cheap, a country which rejected its inhabitants and which was inhospitable
to new comers. Under these conditions, the foundation of the Histadrut was
a central event in the process of the rebirth of the Hebrew People in its
father-land. Our Histadrut is a general organization to its core. It is not
a worker's trade union.' Quoted in Haim Hanegbi, Moshe Machover,
and Akiva Orr, 'The Class Nature of Israel,' in New Left Review
65 (January'February, 1971).
- For some examples of this analysis, see Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor and
the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882'1914 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989); Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of
Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State (Princeton
University Press, 1998) and Ilan Pappe ed., The Israel/Palestine Question:
Rewriting Histories (London: Routledge, 1999).
- 4. Lewin-Epstein, Noah and Moshe Semyonov, 'Occupational Change in
Israel: Bringing the Labor Market Back,' Israel Social Science Research
2, no. 2, (1984): 3'18.
- 5. For detailed discussion on this issue see the work of Jonathan Nitzan
and Shimson Bichler, particularly, 'From War Profits to Peace Dividends:
The New Political Economy of Israel,' Capital and Class, vol.
60 (Autumn 1996).
- 6. There are recent signs that Israeli big business may be attempting to
rebuild the Labor Party as a political force with considerable business support
shifting to Haifa's Labor Mayor Amram Mitzna as a candidate for Labor
Party leadership against Ben Eliezer in recent months.
- World Bank, Trade Options for the Palestinian Economy'Working Paper
No. 21 (English), March 2001.
- The Paris Protocol was an economic agreement signed in 1995 as part of the
Oslo process. It gave precise expectations of which goods Palestinians were
allowed to export and import, as well as tax regulations and other economic
issues.
ADAM HANIEH is a researcher and human rights
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