http://indymedia.org.il
Continued....Friday 23 Nov 2001
author: Dr. Ilan Pappe
More recently, on 2 February 2001, a group of highly respected academics from Tel Aviv University and the Hebrew University organized a day of study on the relationship between the legal system and academia. Among the participants, surprisingly, were the presiding judge in the Katz affair and the rector of Haifa University. The general tenor of the meeting seemed to be against any interference by the legal system in the academic research; more concretely, many participants criticized the University of Haifa for its conduct in the Katz affair. Professor Asa Kasher and Meir Pail reiterated their support for Katz's research, specifically stating that the inaccuracies uncovered by the prosecution did significantly undermine the quality of the dissertation.
SOME IMPLICATIONS
Thus far, the Katz affair sheds light and raises issues in three areas: the place of Palestinian oral history in the historiography of 1948 and the relationship of the Israeli judiciary and academia to the Nakbah. Concerning the first, one of the most noteworthy elements of the debate over the Katz affair was the way in which Palestinian oral testimony was treated. Traditionally, Palestinian oral history--and indeed written works in general by Palestinians concerning 1948--have been branded in Israel as sheer propaganda and wild flights of 'oriental' imagination. Yet the legal challenges to Katz's thesis centered not on the truthfulness of the Palestinian testimonies per se nor on the validity of oral hsitory as a tool in research, but on Katz's mishandling of the testimony. Furthermore, several historians, in dismissing Katz's findings, used as evidence to support their case the fact that the massacre is not mentioned in Walid Khalidi's All That Remains --a work not treated in Israel as an authority before. This is not to say that a "revolution" in Israeli attitudes towards Palestinian history has occurred, and it is obvious that the Palestinian sources were considered reliable only insofar as they did not mention the massacre. Still, if the trial resumes, the oral testimonies by Palestinians on the Nakbah--like the testimonies of Jews on the Holocaust in the Eichmann and Demaniuk trials--will have to be treated as a legitimate source, both in court and in scholarly debate.
The second issue raised by the case is the attitude in principle of the judicial system on the question of the Nakbah. Zionist historiography on 1948 has been almost universally accepted in Israel; even the "new historians" have refused to use the term "ethnic cleansing" in reference to 1948, and with few exceptions have been unwilling to concede that there was a "master plan" of expulsion or conquest. It is thus that the concept of war crimes in relation to the 1948 war has never been raised. Yet it is difficult to see the expulsion (direct and indirect) of some 750,000 Palestinians, the systematic destruction of more than 400 villages and scores of urban neighborhoods, as well the perpetration of some forty massacres of unarmed Palestinians in any other terms. Criminal suits are unlikely to be brought by Palestinians, which legally speaking would face the principle of obsolescence (only grandchildren who can prove direct harm can sue, at least theoretically).
This is why the Tantura case is so important. It is the only case so far in the history of Israel where the Nakbah was discussed in court. By not allowing the trial to continue, the judge prevented Palestinian survivors from telling their story in court. It also indirectly pre-empted future research on 1948 that does not subscribe to Zionist ideology by giving future scholars reason to worry about the legal consequences of taking on the struggle over the past. This becomes a particular sensitive field of research in that it deals with issues of the past that are relevant to the nature of a future comprehensive settlement of the Palestine question.
The third issue is Israeli academia's approach to the Nakbah. A number of members of the academy were only too happy to swoop down like vultures on the methodological defects in the work of a historian just starting out on his academic career--an easy prey by all accounts. One could speculate that the motivation was not simply denial of the massacre--in fact the Nakbah--but a kind of recognition that if Katz had won the case, Israeli academia's role for more than fifty years in suppressing the truth about the Nakbah would itself be on the dock. Jewish participants in the 1948 war were surprised when approached by a Jewish researcher who did not, as is usually the case in Israel, want to hear about their heroism in 1948 but rather confronted them with their barbarism. The more honest among them were not afraid to tell what they had seen, because they were confident, given the reigning ideology that is not opposed to killing Arabs, that even such acts would be protected as exceptional or legitimate. For some, the opportunity to confide in Katz helped to alleviate personal guilt and remorse. Zionist scholars of 1948, it would appear, are less in need of such alleviation, and have lived comfortably enough with their role in covering these crimes. One can perhaps find extenuating circumstances in the actions of the perpetrators, but not for the deniers.
It is difficult to preduct the final results of the Katz case. But based on reactions so far, one can assume that the Jewish academic establishment will continue to try to prevent the legitimization of oral history for 1948, and that it will be more vigilant in making sure that fresh historians confirm the broad lines of the Zionist narrative on 1948. Admittedly, certain foundational myths such as the "few against many" and "the Arab voluntary flight" have already shattered, but the overall narrative has survived these setbacks. The argument now runs as follows: yes, some Palestinian were expelled during the war, but it was simply a byproduct of the fighting, certainly not because of any plan of mass expulsion. Hence, such expulsions as did take place were an integral part of any conventional war and have nothing to with ethnic cleansing and war crimes.
The only way to confront this reality is to encourage independent NGO-type research institutions in Palestine and in Israel entrusted with the task of expanding research on the Nakbah. The first priority is to establish a bank of oral testimonies, before it is too late and there is no one left to interview.
It should be clear by now that no true reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians can ever take place without full awareness of what happened in the Nakbah. It is for this reason that research on the Nakbah by Jewish scholars has to be part of a public campaign based on clear positions vis a vis the conflict and its solution. The questions of compensation, the Palestinian right of return, and Israeli moral responsibility are anyhow already in the public mind of both Israelis and Palestinians as negotiable issues. Finally, research on the Nakbah requires some kind of international protection. The historical research, the public campaign, and the legal defense should be part and parcel of the same political action in Palestine, Israel and abroad.